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THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROFIT 
CONCEPT: ONE ORGANIZATION'S 
EXPERIENCE 
Abstract: The accounting innovation and change literature has em-
phasized the contingent relationship between the accounting system 
and a variety of environmental forces. This paper utilizes a longitudi-
nal analysis to evaluate this contingent relationship within one nine-
teenth century organization, The Calvin Company. The results gener-
ally are consistent with most findings from the literature. In particu-
lar, the study examines the shift in the profit concept to a short-
versus a long-term perspective. This has parallels with the emerging 
role of the corporate form of business organization and the entity, as 
opposed to, proprietary view of accounting. 
The accounting system shaped the organizational reality to the 
extent that the accounting for an event had a subsequent impact 
upon The Calvin Company's direction. The conclusions highlight the 
contextual nature of accounting. Accounting and accounting change 
must be interpreted in terms of the underlying developments within 
the entity, and within its external environment. 
The accounting change and innovation literature has be-
come the focus of research in accounting history [Bhimani, 
1993; Edwards, 1991; Hopewood, 1987]. The present study ex-
amines accounting change within the context of one Nineteenth 
Century organization, specifically the environmental factors re-
lated to the shift in the profit concept from a short- versus a 
long-term perspective. The significance granted to the profit 
concept evolved in tandem with The Calvin Company's adapta-
tion to the changing business conditions of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. A major aspect of the latter was its 
adjustment to the corporate form of business organization. The 
paper begins with a chronology of The Calvin Company (TCC) 
followed by a literature review, the research framework, analy-
sis, conclusions, and interpretation. 
The au tho r gratefully acknowledges the helpful comment s of D. B. 
Thornton, the editor, and the anonymous reviewers, and the research support of 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 
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A CHRONOLOGY OF THE CALVIN COMPANY 
TCC began operations in the 1830s, growing in scale and 
scope throughout the nineteenth century to include (among oth-
ers) shipbuilding, wrecking operations, and towing services.1 
TCC's business enterprises encompassed the several stages 
along the supply chain to meet the market demand for primarily 
oak timber and, to a lesser extent, staves. Given its varied activi-
ties, represented schematically in Appendix 2, TCC's informa-
tion requirements would differ at alternate points along the sup-
ply chain. 
At the supply end, TCC had to decide whether to make or 
buy its timber, to act solely as a forwarder or to sell also on its 
own account, and how to administer its joint ventures and to 
finance its operations overall. On the demand side, TCC had 
particular information needs, for example, to sell its t imber at 
Quebec or to ship it directly to Great Britain. Acting as a com-
mission agent, TCC rafted much timber at the risk of other 
owners. Thus, it had to determine when it was best to sell, tak-
ing into account market conditions, possible commissions and 
the potential competition created by its own timber. As well, 
TCC had to weigh the strategy of contracting to sell its upcom-
ing production (a precursor of futures contracts) against taking 
its chances on the open market. 
In 1836, D. D. Calvin moved his base of operations from 
Clayton, New York to Garden Island, near Kingston, Canada. 
Garden Island offered a strategic location with a good harbor 
for both t imber storage and raft construction. Timber and 
staves first were shipped to Garden Island before subsequent 
rafting to Quebec, with the rafting season running from late 
April until November. In 1839, Calvin entered into a partnership 
with John Counter and Hiram Cook, formalizing an existing 
string of joint ventures. During this early period, financial con-
cerns predominated as the timber market was slow and credit 
was tight. Moreover, the partners had conflicting opinions 
about the advisability of continued timber-cutting during a low 
market (increasing their risk and holding cost) versus the ship-
ment of timber to Garden Island to keep its vessels in operation. 
Counter, discontent with TCC's activities, withdrew from the 
partnership at the end of 1843 and the business was reorganized 
as Calvin, Cook & Company. At this time, C. E. Dunn entered 
1A time-line of the firm is provided in Appendix 1. 
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the firm. The new partnership did not operate without discord 
and T. H. Dunn replaced his brother at the end of 1844. Subse-
quent internal debates resulted in a major restructuring of the 
firm and a new partnership with T. H. Dunn commenced on 
January 1, 1847. 
The period from 1845 to 1850 saw the rise of economic 
liberalism in Great Britain, which brought both the loss of colo-
nial preference and responsible government to the colonies. The 
end of tariff protection in 1846 did not reduce immediately Ca-
nadian exports of hewn timber, due to the concurrent upswing 
in British demand and the gradual elimination of duties. How-
ever, a rush to get shipments to Great Britain before the loss of 
preference resulted in an oversupply in the world market 
[Lower, 1984]. 
As TCC expanded, the partners' geographic separation rein-
forced their differing business interests. In 1850, Dunn with-
drew and Cook and Calvin divided their holdings. D. D. Calvin's 
brother-in-law, Ira A. Breck, purchased a 25 percent interest in 
the firm, and Calvin and Cook formally dissolved their partner-
ship at the end of 1854. During the 1850s, TCC faced both good 
and bad years, as it dealt with the shortcomings of its market 
forecasts and local problems, such as the fear of cholera in 1854 
which disrupted timber rafting. TCC's reported profits also were 
reduced by its policy of taking major write-downs of assets ver-
sus a systematic method of depreciation. This contributed to the 
losses of 1858 and 1859. 
Correspondence of the 1860s reads much like that of the 
1850s. Concern about credit, the tendency to overproduce and 
the declining quality of the timber continued throughout the 
decade. The correspondence from 1867 easily could be mistaken 
for that of 1862 or 1864, were it not for the dates, with the same 
issues repeating themselves. In 1868, TCC began to make ship-
ments directly to Great Britain, in sharp contrast to its initial 
policy of selling all its timber at Quebec. TCC had considered 
shipping "a last resort," and only to be done "under extreme 
necessity." By the end of 1869, the partners' capital had grown 
to more than $360,000 from $160,000 in 1862 (approximately 
12 percent per year). 
TCC entered the 1870s as the industry leader in terms of 
oak timber (QUA, Box 117, Folder 1), reporting its largest prof-
its in 1871 and 1873. The depressed world market reversed this 
positive picture and TCC's reported return dropped by more 
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than 85 percent in 1874, followed in 1875 by its first loss since 
1859. TCC broke even in 1876, with additional losses in the last 
three years of the decade. TCC persisted in its t imber opera-
tions, stockpiling considerable inventory. Activities increasingly 
were concentrated in the United States,2 but these operations 
did not prove profitable. TCC was left with the risk of real estate 
holdings in the United States, and the write-off of considerable 
sums due to poor timber quality. In 1879, TCC reported its larg-
est net loss at more than $91,000. At the beginning of 1880, 
partners ' capital was $316,133.82 compared to $389,479.23 in 
1870. As indicated in Appendix 3, this was a drop of 18.83 per-
cent, and a notable decrease from the years 1873 to 1876 in 
which their capital had been reported at over $500,000. 
In 1880, Breck retired and TCC continued as Calvin & Son. 
In 1884, D. D. Calvin died, and the estate was divided among his 
heirs. TCC's final years were encompassed in the end of the 
square timber trade more generally, as the industry was domi-
nated increasingly by sawn lumber. Incorporated in 1886, TCC 
remained a family enterprise, a factor which appeared to con-
strain its flexibility. The loss of its labor force, transportation 
improvements, and a shorter timber season reinforced TCC's 
declining profitability, as its facilities and ships were ill-suited 
for alternate uses. Operations ceased at the outbreak of World 
War I.3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The accounting innovation and change literature has at-
tempted to explain the adaptation of the accounting system to 
specific organizational circumstances. There is the frequent as-
sumption that change is beneficial, resulting in a better fit be-
tween the organization and its environment. Much of this re-
search has utilized a contingency framework, drawing upon or-
ganization theories of organizational structure and change. 
2 Opera t ions in the United States generally were conducted as joint ventures 
with individual company agents. 
3It has been suggested that TCC ceased operations with the onset of World 
War I [Swainson, 1980]. Examination of minutes of shareholders' and directors' 
meetings [QUA, Volume 80], and of company letters [MMA, Letterbook 23 g 24] 
imply that the decision was taken much earlier. This included the cancellation 
of fortnightly church services at the end of 1913, and the closing of the Garden 
Island school in July of 1914. 
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While structural contingency theories were popular in orga-
nization theory in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, this interest has 
diminished in recent years, especially with the emergence of 
other perspectives such as; organizational ecology, institutional 
theory and organizational economics. However, contingency re-
search remains popular in accounting, especially in the area of 
budgetary control [Merchant, 1984], budget-related behavior 
[Williams et al, 1990], accounting information system design 
[Kim, 1988] and strategy [Simons, 1987]. Early studies in both 
organization theory and accounting posited mere congruence 
theories and lacked a link between organizational fit and orga-
nizational effectiveness. The rudimentary notion was that struc-
ture was contingent upon contextual factors, thus variations in 
the two were related [Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Otley and 
Wilkinson, 1988]. 
In some ways, the ecological (natural selection) and institu-
tional (managerial selection) perspectives justify congruence. 
The former views fit as an evolutionary process of adaptation 
wherein only the best-performing organizations survive. It is 
also more pessimistic, as organizations are subject to structural 
inertia due to internal and external pressures for stability. The 
institutional view takes into account micro and macro levels of 
organizational design, but also constraints in terms of practices 
and prescriptions imposed by institutional forces [Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 1985, pp. 516-17]. More complete formulations of 
contingency theory have emphasized the notion of fit between 
the organization and its environment [Drazin and Van de Ven, 
1985; Gresov, 1989; Kim, 1988]. Pennings [1992] has described 
the latter as the equifinality view as opposed to the determinism 
inherent in the natural and managerial selection approaches. 
Contextual variables have been classified broadly in terms 
of three categories: organizational size, technology, and envi-
ronment. In turn, these factors are hypothesized to influence 
the organization and its accounting and information system. 
Organizational size was utilized by Bruns and Waterhouse 
[1975] in their study of budgetary control. Increasing size was 
correlated to greater structure in activity and decentralization of 
control. Merchant [1981, 1984] also included the effect of size in 
the adoption of alternate control strategies. Increased size led to 
greater decentralization and reduced interaction amongst sub-
ordinates and superiors. Greater reliance upon procedures and 
paperwork also was noted, supporting earlier work by Gordon 
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and Miller [1976]. There is some debate, however, whether size 
is a contingent variable, or whether it is within the organiza-
tion's control and relatively fixed in the short term. 
Technology has been included within contingency research 
beginning with Woodward's [1965] studies of workflow and 
structure. A number of studies have incorporated technological 
effects on accounting system design. A difficulty has been the 
varied concepts of technology utilized. For example, technology 
has been characterized alternatively in terms of production in-
puts, transformation and outputs. 
Within account ing, technology has been theorized by 
Waterhouse and Tiessen [1978] in t e rms of technological 
routineness and environmental predictability. More recent em-
pirical studies by Merchant [1984, 1985] define technology as 
the level of automation and predictability of the production pro-
cess. Kim [1988] and Williams et al [1990] adopt Thompson's 
concept of departmental interdependency. Given that techno-
logical change cont r ibu tes to env i ronmenta l uncer ta in ty , 
Pennings [1992] has argued that the former should be sub-
sumed within the broader category of environment. 
Environmental uncertainty has been included in contin-
gency studies beginning with the seminal work of Burns and 
Stalker [1961] and Lawrence and Lorsch [1967]. Gordon and 
Narayanan [1984] included perceived environmental uncer-
tainty in terms of the impact upon organizational structure (or-
ganic/mechanistic) and the type of accounting information sys-
tem utilized. Govindarajan [1984, p. 127] emphasized environ-
mental uncertainty, defining the latter as "the unpredictability 
in the actions of the customers, suppliers, competitors and regu-
latory groups that comprise the external environment of the 
business unit." Gordon and Miller [1976] subdivided environ-
mental uncertainty in terms of environmental dynamism, het-
erogeneity and hostility, whereas Amigoni [1978] classified it 
wi th respect to turbulence and discontinuity. Khandwal la 
[1972] dealt specifically with the level of competition facing the 
individual firm. Again, these different ways to operationalize the 
construct have led to confused and often weak results from em-
pirical studies. 
An event-history analysis of the California wine industry by 
Delacroix and Swaminathan [1991] united a number of these 
related concepts together as environmental variation: the degree 
of environmental uncertainty, the amplitude of change in the 
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environment and the frequency of this change. Although the 
authors adopted an ecological approach, the study examined the 
question of adaptive organizational change and the impact of 
the latter upon organizational survival. Moreover, survival was 
distinguished from performance. The former being a necessary 
precondition for organizational fitness and the latter denoting 
preparedness for future action. 
Haveman [1992] studied organizational change in the sav-
ings and loan industry in the United States, under the assump-
tion that environmental change occurs at the same rate for all 
organizations in the population. A motivation for the study was 
the paradox within ecological theory that change increases the 
risk of failure, but that organizational change is nonetheless 
abundant [Haveman, 1992, p .53]. Haveman focused on changes 
in the organizational domain; domain being defined as the cli-
ents served, goods and services provided, and technologies uti-
lized. Two changes affecting the savings and loan industry have 
parallels to TCC: first, technological innovation, including the 
speed of information processing, which increased economies of 
scale and scope; second, macroeconomic change with respect to 
shifts in the money supply and the volatility of financial credit. 
The two are not disjoint. Technological change, coupled with 
deregulation, enhanced competition, reduced profit margins, 
and increased overall environmental uncertainty. 
Organizational culture often has been overlooked in contin-
gency studies, although its influence was included by Flamholtz 
[1983] in the framework of the overall organizational control 
system. The relationship between accounting and culture re-
cently has received more interest, wherein organizational cul-
ture incorporates the shared values of the organization as em-
bodied in the control system. Importantly, culture includes the 
selection and socialization process [Van Maanen & Schein, 
1979] and power relations [Markus and Pfefffer, 1983]. Cultural 
factors have been recognized in studies of nineteenth century 
Canadian business [Bliss, 1987; McCalla, 1979, 1984]. Business 
relations and social ties frequently reinforced each other. Trust 
was the key factor in the granting of credit, for example, espe-
cially when market contractions occurred. McCalla [1984, p. 18] 
has described the nineteenth century business environment as 
"competitive yet mutually supporting." This description is simi-
lar to Ouchi's [1979, 1980] view that cultural or clan mecha-
nisms reduce conflicts between individual and organizational 
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goals, promoting a sense of community. Moreover, clan mecha-
nisms are preferable in terms of lower transaction costs as op-
posed to market and bureaucratic control systems. 
Many studies into organizational and accounting change 
have demonstrated weak results. This has been due, in part, to 
inadequate data and mis-specification of the contextual vari-
ables. Dent [1990] suggests that the lack of compelling results 
also stems from the deterministic implications of these contin-
gency theories. Likewise, Simons [1987, 1990] asserts the need 
for a more voluntaristic position, especially in relation to orga-
nizational strategy. Strategy previously has been included in 
studies by Khandwalla [1972] and Govindarajan and Gupta 
[1985]. This study does not incorporate strategy, but does exam-
ine the dynamic process through which innovation and change 
occurs. The longitudinal nature of the research mitigates a limi-
tation of cross-sectional studies by examining processes and 
accounting's implication in the perception of organizational 
possibilities. 
The foregoing review demonstrates that the current paper is 
grounded in an established literature, but also contributes to it 
by emphasizing longitudinal processes. Thus, the paper should 
be of interest to not only accounting historians, but also ac-
counting and organizational researchers examining the issues of 
(accounting) innovation and change. 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
TCC's history has been divided into two periods. During the 
first phase (1839 to 1869), the company commenced operations, 
growing in both scale and scope, primarily within Canada. The 
second phase (1870 to 1915) incorporated TCC's diversification 
efforts into the United States, the increasing importance of non-
timber freighting, and the wind-up of its operations. The two 
periods have been determined ex post based upon the presence 
of management accounting information during TCC's second 
phase. 
Data Sources 
The source mater ia ls utilized in this research can be 
grouped into three categories. Each of these categories are de-
scribed in the following paragraphs. 
The Calvin Company Records contained at the Queen's Uni-
versity Archives, Kingston, Canada comprise the primary re-
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search data . These documen t s encompass records of the 
company's timber, ship-building, salvage and towing operations; 
along with records pertaining to family and personal legal mat-
ters. The catalogue lists 256 bound volumes and 136 boxes, ar-
ranged according to the main group or category, as well as 
chronologically. 
The Queen's University collection is strengthened by its 
smaller counterpart, The Calvin Collection, archived at The Ma-
rine Museum of the Great Lakes, Kingston, Canada. The latter 
contains nine boxes of chronologically-ordered records of a per-
sona] and business nature, as well as a large number of bound 
volumes of company and personal records. Since the Marine 
Museum primari ly contains records of the Garden Island 
branch, it fills significant gaps within the Queen's University 
collection. 
Publications dealing with TCC's history have served as a 
starting point to determine critical events in the company's life. 
These sources have been used with caution, given that many 
have been written by family members. A wide spectrum of pub-
lished materials in both accounting and Canadian economic his-
tory has been consulted to provide the necessary contextual 
background. A list of these sources is included in the References. 
Data Analysis 
The evolution of TCC underscores a variety of economic 
and social factors which affected and were affected by its opera-
tions. The cross-temporal comparison of the accounting system 
in TCC's two phases seeks to uncover clues with respect to 
TCC's evolution, and with respect to environmental changes 
which are linked to the former. Based upon the review of the 
existing literature and an evaluation of TCC's own chronology, 
the following contextual variables potentially had an impact 
upon TCC's activities, and upon its internal accounting system: 
(1) Organizational size — the greater scope of the business, 
including the geographic dispersion of the partners, 
and of their agents. 
(2) Technological innovation — advances in the timber in-
dustry which fed back into the company's operations, 
and influenced its methods to account for them. 
(3) Macroeconomic change — shifts in financial credit and 
the profit focus, especially due to the shortened operat-
ing cycle in the timber industry. 
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(4) Organizational culture — the importance of family con-
nections to provide for stewardship and accountability, 
and to reduce problems of agency, thus making explicit 
contracts less important. 
THE PROFIT CONCEPT IN FOCUS 
The transformation from bookkeeping to accounting has 
been described by Littleton [1966, p. 165] as the shift from "a 
mere method of systematically recording exchanges into a 
means of giving business management an effective control over 
its affairs." Included in this transformation has been a shift 
from a long- to a short-run profit concept. Initially, profit de-
noted the increase in net assets over time, but this view has 
been replaced by the focus upon the difference in net assets 
between two points in time. The change relates to two account-
ing developments at the end of the nineteenth century: the 
emergence of the entity, in contrast to the proprietary, view of 
accounting and the concept of the periodic income of a going-
concern. Both are related to the rise of the corporate form of 
business organization [Littleton, 1966, pp. 165-221; MacNeal, 
1970, pp. 292-295].4 This altered emphasis emerged in TCC, as it 
adapted to the business conditions of the late nineteenth cen-
tury. One aspect of the latter was TCC's adjustment to the cor-
porate form of business organization. 
TCC operated within an environment in which communica-
tions were slow, and often faulty. Decisions were taken with a 
long-term perspective, which influenced the nature of the busi-
ness enterprise. The nineteenth century concepts of periodicity 
and profit cannot be equated with the timely reporting of yearly 
income. The determination of profit envisaged a longer time 
horizon with profit calculation made at the wind-up of indi-
vidual ventures, or the liquidation of a business enterprise. The 
partners operated jointly to augment their personal wealth, the 
evaluation of their success to be made only at the dissolution of 
the partnership. Economic circumstances weighed heavily upon 
their ultimate success or failure, but little could be done to in-
fluence such events. Instead, TCC rode out the market fluctua-
tions in a never-ending quest for credit, and for new avenues of 
4This statement is not intended to suggest that the entity concept was un-
known before this time. Rather, its roots can be traced to the venture system of 
accounting which was prevalent in the fifteenth century. 
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commercial endeavor. The formal partnerships were based 
upon a commercial system grounded in concepts of trust, stew-
ardship, and the accountability of the firm's individual members 
[Bliss, 1987; McCalla, 1979]. 
This long-term perspective was incorporated into both 
TCCs Articles Of Agreement, and the operation of its accounting 
system. The former set out the copartnership terms, including 
the calculation of and the allocation of profit. The agreement 
provided the initial basis for partnership valuation, as well as 
the contractual basis for wealth-sharing at final dissolution. It 
also ensured that the partners did not operate in conflict with, 
or in competition with, their mutual interests. The opening of 
branch offices and the geographic dispersion of the partners 
reinforced this need for accountability. 
The Articles Of Agreement [MMA 980.150.82] between 
Calvin, Cook and Counter stated "that all gains, profits and in-
crease arising from the said joint Trade and business shall from 
time to time during the term of Copartnership be equally and 
proportionally divided between the said Copartnership share 
and share alike and that also all such losses as shall appear in 
the said joint business . . . " Profit would be determined by the 
rendering of accounts by the copartners related to all "receipts 
and disbursements and all other things whatsoever done or suf-
fered by them in the said joint business . . . " The document was 
not specific about either the timing of profit, other than "from 
time to time", or, about the length of the partnership. These 
points were clarified in the next two agreements. 
When C. E. Dunn entered at January 1844, the Articles Of 
Agreement [MMA 980.150.176] stipulated "that all gains, profits 
and increase arising from said Trade and business shall be di-
vided at the expiration of the term as herein provided of said 
Copartnership, in proportion to their respective stock or share 
in said business or Trade. And that also all the loss or losses 
which may accrue or arise from said business . . . shall be 
borne, in proportion to their respective shares in said business, 
by the said parties." The term of the partnership was set as five 
years from the date of the contract, unless otherwise dissolved 
as provided for in the agreement. Dunn entered the partnership 
with no capital contribution; a "free-rider" in that he was to 
receive a proportionate share of partnership increases and de-
creases. Differences between the accounting records and the 
Statement Of Affairs (SOA) upon which the partnership valua-
11
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tion had been determined suggest that the accounting system 
could not be relied upon for wealth allocation, and that any 
Profit and Loss (P&L) balance would not be an accurate esti-
mate of partnership wealth. 
The third Articles of Agreement between D. D. Calvin, H. 
Cook and T. H. Dunn [MMA 980.150.221] had more stringent 
accountability provisions related to partnership shares and re-
sponsibilities. Greater emphasis upon the accounting system as 
an interim measure of both stewardship and accountability was 
observed. It also specified the term of the copartnership, at the 
end of which profits or losses would be divided according to the 
partners ' individual shares — five-twelfths each for Calvin and 
Cook, and two-twelfths for Dunn. It limited withdrawals by in-
dividual partners to a monthly allowance, and eliminated their 
authority to extend credit. These enhancements to both the ac-
counting system and the contractual agreement sought to main-
tain the accountability of the partners which had been the ma-
jor feature of the 1839 agreement. 
Given the partnership contract, there was no requirement 
to calculate profit or loss on a systematic (such as yearly) basis, 
since the final gain or loss would be declared upon dissolution 
of the joint business. The partners were required to present an 
annual report of the transactions undertaken related to the joint 
ventures, but this did not require that any interim profit or loss 
be divided amongst them. For example, at the end of the Calvin, 
Cook & Counter partnership (December 1843), the overall profit 
of the ventures, as stated in the second SOA was £12,223 
($48,892) [MMA 980.150.174]. Importantly, the 1843 valuation 
could not have been made from the accounting records alone, 
but necessitated the use of the SOA. The SOA valuation was a 
mixture of book records and current value estimates. The latter 
were provided by various businessmen called upon with respect 
to specific assets, such as schooners and real estate. Receivables 
were stated at their net realizable value, with deductions made 
for estimated losses. Shipments in transit, and inventory on 
hand, were recorded at net realizable value, with allowance for 
estimated expenses to be incurred. In short, these accounting 
est imates of current value were a surrogate for prices in 
present-day equity markets. 
Including the sum attributed to goodwill, Counter's one-
third share (£5,000) was debited to the P&L account, while re-
ducing his liability to the firm. As noted by Littleton [1966, p. 
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167], the calculation of profit as the net difference between as-
sets and liabilities emphasized the nineteenth century view 
which equated profit with an increase in capital. Thus, the SOA 
determined the return of capital to the partners. Although it was 
used only infrequently during the period from 1839 to 1869 
(rather than to determine the outcome of individual ventures), 
the SOA provided the overall valuation of the joint ventures 
comprising the partnership. During the second phase, the SOA 
calculated return on capital, and allocated owners' equity be-
tween capital and profit. It was prepared yearly upon TCC's 
incorporation in 1886. The SOA was the formal document with 
which to determine the respective shares of the individual part-
ners, initially at dissolution, and yearly once the firm attained 
limited-liability status. 
From 1839 to 1850, the accounting system did not record 
profit in each year. The P&L Account was balanced at the end 
of 1840, 1841 and 1842. These amounts were not transferred 
elsewhere in the accounts, and the P&L Account was set back to 
zero. When J. Counter withdrew, the P&L Account was not bal-
anced at all. The £5,000 value placed on a one-third interest 
formed the valuation basis for contracting when a new partner-
ship was established in January 1844. The subsequent partner-
ship began with a capital stock of £15,000, and C. E. Dunn was 
expected to pay £2,500 for his one-sixth share. 
When the second copartnership began in 1844, and con-
tinuing with the third agreement from 1846 to 1849, the P&L 
balance was carried forward each year. Only at the end of 1849 
was this amount transferred to the Stock Account. The dissolu-
tion of the partnership in June 1850, concurrent with D. D. 
Calvin's and H. Cook's agreement to divide their interest, elimi-
nated the balance of the P&L Account.5 The shares of the indi-
vidual partners were determined by the evaluation of their joint 
property. Calvin and Cook accepted responsibility for the assets 
and liabilities of their respective operations, along with the 
transfer by Calvin to Cook of the former's share in certain as-
sets. 
5Calvin and Cook operated in outward form as a partnership, yet in sub-
stance were two separate businesses. This was formally recognized in 1854. The 
two partners did not wish to dissolve their arrangement formally in 1850, since 
the change at Quebec and additional changes at Hamilton and Garden Island 
might have been perceived as instability in their operations [QUA and MMA 
Calvin Company correspondence]. 
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Thus, the long-term view of profit was reinforced by the 
partners ' own attitude and conduct, and also by the Articles of 
Agreement which established the means for profit calculation 
and allocation. Each copartnership terminated with the overall 
evaluation of assets and liabilities. Profit was declared as the 
increase in net assets over time. 
When Ira A. Breck entered the business in 1851, the value 
of his share was determined to be £2,606.11.6 (adjusted to 
£3,549.12. 6 in March 1853 to correct earlier recording errors). 
This amount represented one quarter of D. D. Calvin's equity, 
calculated as the difference between the assets and liabilities of 
Calvin Cook & Company at December 31, 1850. Despite the 
introduction of a yearly profit number at this time, the concept 
of profit was not altered significantly. The profit or loss was 
mingled with other amounts in the Stock Account, and essen-
tially was absorbed into capital. The shortcomings of this proce-
dure were beginning to emerge — without the timely allocation 
of profit, there existed no method for Breck to pay for his part-
nership share. 
In February 1860, journal entries (totalling $43,182.72) rec-
ognized the division of the business at January 1851. Entries 
allocated on a 75/25 basis the balance in the Stock Account 
resulting from profits and losses since 1851, and adjusted for 
Breck's salary during these years. The allocation of profit on a 
yearly basis according to the partners' capital shares provided 
Breck with a capital source with which to reduce his outstand-
ing liability. The change culminated in greater attention to the 
yearly profit figure. The value placed upon Breck's share in 1851 
was calculated from the value of the assets and liabilities, as 
recorded in the accounting records. This was a break from the 
earlier years when the latter were not relied upon for such valu-
ations, thus creating the initial need for the SOA. 
Beginning in 1860, the profit figure was both calculated and 
allocated at the year-end closing of the books. Nonetheless, the 
allocation did not imply that profit was considered to be short-
term in nature, i.e., similar to the nineteenth century concept of 
income calculated on a going-concern basis. These changes also 
simplified the preparation of a balance sheet, yet there is no 
evidence that such a document was utilized. It probably was not 
necessary, since the two partners were in close contact with 
each other, and with business operations. The year-end closing 
procedures remained basically the same, although the system to 
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allocate transactions became much more complex as TCC ex-
panded. While each individual account still was treated as a 
separate fund, one such account would be allocated to several 
others before a final profit or loss was determined. This had the 
effect of decreasing the potential information content of the fi-
nal profit or loss figure from an individual venture. The transfer 
of costs from one account to another could create a gain in one 
account at the expense of others, contingent upon the transfer 
price used. For example, the company store and bakehouse gen-
erally showed a profit each year, yet this gain resulted from 
sales primarily made to TCC's operating departments. While the 
need for a balance sheet was not apparent during the first phase 
of TCC, this situation changed in the second phase, when the 
balance sheet assumed an important role within the reporting 
system. 
TCC had to deal with changes in both its internal and exter-
nal environment throughout the 1870s. In 1871, the entry of 
Calvin's son, Hiram, meant that profit was to be divided 
amongst three individuals. Hiram assumed a 25 percent interest 
in 1873, which unfortunately for him corresponded with the 
downturn in the world timber market.6 
The preparation of a balance sheet was mentioned in a let-
ter dated January 1872, written by Hiram to his father [MMA 
980.150.280], and its preparation in 1870 can be inferred from 
other archival documents. The General Ledger indicates that the 
balancing of the P&L account was undertaken in two steps: an 
initial balancing determined the period's profit or loss, prior to 
the drawing of partners' salaries. The second step recorded the 
latter amount, such that the final profit, net of salaries, was 
revealed. Although this two-stage balancing appears to have 
been dropped in subsequent years, its use in 1870 may be ex-
plained by the increase in the salaries of Calvin and Breck from 
$3,000 to $5,000 each per annum. The payment of a yearly sal-
ary, in lieu of interest on their respective capital shares, had 
been confirmed in an agreement dated December 25, 1871 
[MMA 980.150.973]. Hiram Calvin's interest in the 1871 profit 
probably was related to his entry into the business at this time. 
He was to receive 75 percent of the profit from the operation of 
the government tug-line service. 
6This was especially unfortunate, since Hiram had agreed to finance his 
share with yearly payments with interest calculated at 6 percent. 
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The profit numbers , which had been rising during the 
1860s and early 1870s, were transformed into heavy losses. Sig-
nificantly, TCC retained its long-term perspective, essentially 
continuing to make timber, build ships, and to operate its other 
facilities in the belief that the tide eventually would turn. At the 
end of 1879, the firm's stock of unsold oak lying in various 
Quebec coves amounted to 1,774,000 feet [Box 135, Folder 7, 
1878-79]. With Hiram Calvin's withdrawal from the partnership 
in 1877, it was possible for the two remaining partners to ab-
sorb the heavy losses. 
While TCC attempted to cushion itself from sagging timber 
markets, and changing business conditions (such as increased 
competition in rafting, the shift from wood to coal fuel, and 
from ship to rail transport, the need to adapt became obvious in 
the 1880s. At Breck's withdrawal, the long-term view prevailed 
for the last time. The accounting for this change affirmed that 
the two partners were to arrive at a final calculation of their 
profits over the period from 1851 to 1880. The Articles Of Agree-
ment [MMA 980.150.976] of April 1880, which established the 
terms of Breck's retirement, provided for the transfer by Breck 
to Calvin of the former's interests in the firm, except for speci-
fied assets. Breck also was to receive $12,500 with interest at six 
percent per annum on the unpaid balance. In total, Breck re-
ceived assets valued at $33,000 compared to his initial capital 
interest of $14,199. The balance of $29,702 in Breck's Capital 
Account was declared a profit, which suggests that his interest 
had been overstated. Despite the yearly division of profit from 
1851 to 1879, the final determination of this gain was made 
only at partnership dissolution. 
Hiram Calvin reentered the business upon Breck's retire-
ment. The Indenture [MMA 980.150.726] between Hiram and 
his father stated that the former would receive a six percent 
payment on his Capital Stock as at April 1880 ($22,055.04), plus 
a yearly salary of $2,500. All profits or losses would accrue to D. 
D. Calvin. 
While this arrangement may have been sufficient while D. 
D. Calvin was alive and head of the business, it was not ad-
equate once his death cast the future course of TCC into doubt. 
Equally, the profit concept proved inadequate once the corpo-
rate form of business was adopted in 1886. Littleton [1966, p. 
217] has described this inadequacy as follows: 
But for a going concern the final facts are not yet avail-
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able; it does not suffice to consider values (assets and 
liabilities) as if in liquidation, nor to use current values, 
for in both cases there is a lack of reality in the result-
ing calculation of profit because of the lack of actuality 
of the values used. The modern problem has come to 
be viewed as the problem of ascertaining income rather 
than profit; that is to say, the need at present is to 
distinguish between operating income and capital in-
crements. 
The year-end procedure whereby profit was transferred to 
the partners ' capital accounts did not suffice once TCC was or-
ganized as a corporation, with contributed capital and the po-
tential for both dividends and surplus. The situation also un-
derscored TCC's need to move from a family business to the 
consideration of the family and the business as two separate 
entities. 
At this juncture, the SOA reappeared in a much different 
format. The SOA next was used in 1884 in connection with the 
settlement of D. D. Calvin's estate.7 Upon incorporation in 1886, 
D. D. Calvin's heirs transferred to TCC their interest in the busi-
ness assets in return for a cash settlement or shares of the new 
enterprise. Initially, TCC had to finance the share purchase, as 
their only collateral was their interest in the very assets now 
transferred to the firm. The new corporation issued capital 
shares in the amount of $157,500 (1,575 shares with a par-value 
of $100 each). TCC was required to distinguish clearly capital 
and profit, as capital had to be maintained, i.e., no dividends 
could be paid from issued capital. Corporate status legally re-
quired the presentation of an annual report to shareholders, 
thus the SOA was prepared yearly in a more detailed and formal 
manner. Of particular note was the linkage of the amounts re-
corded in the SOA with those recorded in the General Ledger. 
The SOA summarized the ledger entries for each account such 
that all gains and losses could be traced to their original source. 
The SOA also reinforced the duality of the accounting system, 
since it arrived at a profit number by the examination of indi-
vidual accounts while the P&L Account yielded this same figure 
by an alternate route. The SOA clarified when such gains were 
7The settlement was not finalized for a number of years, given the mingling 
of the estate with company operations. 
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from capital or operations, which the P&L Account did not dif­
ferentiate. Since issued capital stock was constant at $157,500, 
the SOA provided a means to divide owners' equity between 
profit made in the course of business operations versus in­
creases in capital. Yet TCC's continued use of a fund system for 
its long-lived assets potentially could have obscured the differ­
ence between profits (or losses) arising from operations rather 
than from the valuation or liquidation of assets. 
Additionally, the SOA indicated whether any profit led to a 
dividend payment or a contribution to a capital surplus. Two 
features of TCC's dividend policy are noteworthy. First, except 
for the year 1891, TCC declared a yearly dividend from 1888 to 
1907. However, five of the nineteen payments were made, in 
whole or in part, by drawing down the Surplus Account. Sec­
ond, the payment of a cash dividend implied the need for in­
creased credit or for the liquidation of an asset. Only in 1894 
did TCC possess adequate cash resources to cover the dividend 
payment. A comparison of TCC's dividend payments to the cur­
rent (and most liquid) assets of cash and bills receivable indi­
cates that the dividend exceeded these liquid assets from 15.10 
to 858.66 percent.8 
TCC's dividend policy also contributed to the erosion of its 
capital base. During the period from 1887 to 1915, TCC had 
total gains of $172,827 of which it paid out 76.59 percent in 
dividends9. This left the firm without adequate funds to invest in 
new technology, let alone to finance ongoing operations. The 
balance sheets from 1887 to 1915 trace TCC's decline during 
this period. The company moved from a surplus to a deficit 
situation in 1911. From 1887 to 1915, TCC showed a profit in 22 
of 29 years. However, this profit as a percentage of issued capi­
tal ranged from a low of 0.20 percent in 1887 to a high in 1890 
of 21.22 percent. Losses were much higher in percentage terms, 
ranging from 6.47 percent in 1908 to 50.21 percent in 1914. The 
balance sheets also indicate the decrease in net assets from 
$157,812,42 in 1887 to $11,966.16 in 1915. At the end of 1915, 
the deficit account equalled 92.02 percent of paid up capital.10 
8The average of the excess in these years was 169.93 percent (standard 
deviation σ = 222.09, n = 19). 
9TCC's dividend policy and its financial impact are summarized in Appendi­
ces 4 and 5. 
10This percentage was 96.56% in 1919, the last year for which financial 
statements have been located in the archival records. 
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This dividend policy could be considered a good strategy from 
the viewpoint of the firm and the entrepreneur jointly. TCC pos-
sibly was liquidated gradually for reinvestment or consumption 
by the owners. 
As stated earlier, the concept of profit evolved during the 
company's life from the calculation of return of capital to the 
determination of return on capital — a stock versus a flow con-
cept. Before incorporation, the balance sheet calculated profit 
as the net value of assets. It reinforced the nineteenth century 
view of profit as an increase in capital, as the yearly gain or loss 
was absorbed into the partners' capital accounts. This reflected 
TCC's long-run focus and the proprietary view of accounting. 
The accounting equation was Assets = Liabilities + Owners' Eq-
uity. This view was evident at Breck's retirement in 1880 at 
which point the partnership's profit (return of capital) could be 
determined. 
Moreover, when the SOA was employed in 1842 and 1843 
(and possibly 1850), its primary objective was the calculation of 
the return of partners ' capital. It established the change in 
wealth over time — the return of capital. The latter was a stock 
concept, as it assessed the increase in net assets over time. Since 
the partnership agreements called for the division of profit at 
the end of the various joint ventures, it was simply a matter of 
calculating the difference in net assets (assets less liabilities) 
over time. This difference was owners' capital. A profit was de-
clared if this amount exceeded the original contribution made 
by the partners. For example, at the end of 1843, a profit was 
considered to have been made11, but no estimation of the rate of 
profit or of the rate of return on capital was made. Further, 
there was no assessment of the decrease in this return during 
the period from 1842 to 1843. Profit was a long-term concept, 
and only deemed to have been realized upon termination of the 
partnership. 
Subsequent to incorporation in 1886, the SOA returned in 
an altered format to calculate the return on capital — a flow 
concept. It focused on the short run, and the profit made in a 
single year, which permitted the profit of a single period to be 
related and compared to that of other periods. The SOA indi-
cated the allocation of profit between surplus and dividends, or 
the payment of dividends via a reduction in the surplus account. 
11Counter's award of £5,000 exceeded his initial contribution of £3,000. 
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Additionally, the SOA provided the return-on-capital figure, 
since the issued capital was constant at $157,500. TCC's man-
agement did evaluate the return on capital (ROC) for the period 
from 1888 to 1913 [MMA, Letterbook 23, pp. 728-729]. Over this 
26 year period, TCC paid an average dividend of $5,088.45 per 
year. This represented a ROC of 3.23 percent per year. The re-
p o r t fu r the r i nd i ca t ed the to t a l ga ins a n d losses were 
$179,183.91, an average gain of $3,041.69 per year. The evalua-
tion of the total profit over a 26 year period suggests that TCC 
had not shifted completely from a long-run profit to a yearly 
income figure. Moreover, the indicated average gain represented 
a ROC of only 1.93 percent. In contrast, the dividend payment 
was greater, ranging from two to six percent of issued capital. 
However, TCC's actual rate of return was more variable, ranging 
from a loss of 29.24 percent to a gain of 21.22 percent.12 It is not 
unlikely that this evaluation, along with a further loss in 1913, 
motivated the decision to wind-up operations in March 1914. 
Interestingly, it was also in 1914 that TCC replaced the SOA 
with a Profit & Loss Statement. 
The shift to a limited-liability company did not enhance 
TCC's viability, as family members did not distinguish TCC 
from the estate of D. D. Calvin. The payment of dividends over 
the period from 1888 to 1907, instead of the reinvestment of 
funds, led to the erosion of the firm's capital base. The short-run 
fixation made it more difficult for TCC to invest the capital 
required to position itself as a forwarder in markets other than 
square timber. As noted by H. Calvin in a letter to his brother-
in-law dated September 1886 [QUA, Volume 26, Folio 67], it 
might have been preferable for Hiram to have purchased the 
assets of the business, rather than to deal with the varied inter-
ests of family members and other shareholders. In time, Calvin 
became the majority shareholder, but this alone did not reverse 
the firm's fortunes. 
CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION 
Studies of organizational and accounting change have ex-
amined the impact of various contextual variables upon the or-
ganization and its accounting system. Parallels can be drawn 
with TCC's own experience. In broad terms, TCC's accounting 
12The analysis of TCC's profitability for the years 1887 to 1915 is presented 
in Appendix 6. 
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system moved from a recorder of events to a system which 
would provide the means to control its operations. 
It has been hypothesized [Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; 
Merchant, 1981, 1984] the organizational size influences the ac-
counting system, especially in terms of standardization and 
complexity. TCC's case reinforces this argument. During TCC's 
early years, accounts were not kept in a timely manner and 
were closed variously, depending upon the circumstances of the 
individual venture. The accounting records were not relied upon 
for partnership valuation, as the former were incomplete. The 
dissolution of the first partnership in 1843 was based upon the 
SOA prepared by an arbitrator. Similarly, the partners' respec-
tive shares at the dissolution in June 1850 resulted from a nego-
tiated settlement, as was the division of assets between Calvin 
and Cook. 
Over time, reliance upon the accounting records increased, 
as they became more systematic. The accounting system's role 
was enhanced by the growing concern for partners' accountabil-
ity, and by their geographic dispersion. Moreover, various con-
tracts for partnerships, and joint operations were tied to the 
accounting records for profit determination. For example, the 
value of Breck's share at 1851 was derived from the recorded 
values in the accounting records, whereas previous partnerships 
had used current-value estimates made by partners and outside 
arbitrators. In the initial years, agency concerns appeared to 
outweigh those pertaining to the relevance of these estimates. 
This interpretation lends support to the findings of Gordon and 
Miller [1976] and Merchant [1981, 1984] that increased organi-
zational size leads to greater reliance upon an administrative 
control strategy and more formal patterns of communication. 
The account ing system also was affected by in ternal 
changes. In December of 1846, the reorganization of the part-
nership brought a concurrent reorganization of the accounting 
records to include the valuation of its net assets, and the record-
ing of the partners' respective shares. In 1860, the calculation of 
the partners' capital accounts changed, including the yearly allo-
cation of profit. 
As TCC entered its second phase, emphasis upon the ac-
counting system increased, as the yearly profit calculation was 
granted greater significance. This situation parallelled changes 
in the internal organization, especially the entry into the firm of 
H.A. Calvin in the early 1870s. The accounting system ex-
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panded to provide better control of TCC's operations, as they 
grew in scale and scope. As noted, the growth of the firm also 
led to improved methods to account for the partners ' capital 
interest. Again, this effect of size is consistent with earlier find-
ings of Bruns and Waterhouse [1975] and Merchant [1981, 
1984]. 
Interestingly, TCC also provides a counter-example in terms 
of decreased reliance on the accounting system as the organiza-
tion contracted. The later years saw the streamlining of the ac-
counting system in tandem with that of TCC's operations. Sum-
mary accounts were employed, along with the less frequent re-
cording of events. This tendency to infrequent reporting pre-
vailed during the economic downturn of the 1870, as well as 
when operations declined in the twentieth century. Thus it may 
be beneficial to explore further the role of the accounting sys-
tem in organizational decline, in terms of the information 
which the system generates and how this information is uti-
lized. 
Haveman [1992] has examined whether macroeconomic 
change, which leads to organizational change, proves beneficial 
in terms of the organization's subsequent performance and 
changes for survival. The results of the study provide some sup-
port for the proposition that "diversification is beneficial if it 
builds on competences developed by operating in the organiza-
t ional domain and hazardous if it is not related to those 
competences [p. 71]." TCC also confronted macroeconomic 
change in terms of a shortened operating and financial cycle, 
and an increased reliance on external financing. 
For example, to reduce the need for short-term financing, 
TCC moved from a partnership to a corporation. Incorporation 
resulted in a legal requirement to provide a balance sheet, along 
with changes in the latter's composition to account for issued 
capital and surplus. Profit no longer could be absorbed into 
capital at year end, but the separation of the two was required. 
The yearly preparation of this information potentially contrib-
uted to the short-run focus, as revealed by TCC's decisions to 
emphasize the results of the current year, in contrast to its long-
term viability. 
These alterations also were necessary theoretically to deal 
with the altered meaning of the profit concept. The emergent 
concept was linked more closely to the present concept of in-
come — the periodic profit of a going-concern [Littleton, 1966]. 
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While the calculation of profit brought together the related con-
cepts of efficiency and effectiveness, it increasingly shifted 
TCC's attention to the short-term profit number. This view was 
reinforced by the existence of shareholders who were not ac-
tively involved in the business. The former were concerned with 
the potential for and the payment of their annual dividend. This 
concern may have differed from that of others, such as H. 
Calvin, who had been active in the firm, and continued to man-
age it. The heterogeneity of interests reduced TCC's ability to 
pursue opportunities, and to implement plans to ensure the 
continued success of the business. 
During TCC's later years, the balance sheet also tracked the 
firm's decline. While its yearly preparation indicated the impact 
of the past year's results and provided a starting point to plan 
future operations, TCC's management did not seem to be sensi-
tive to the information in its accounting reports, including the 
obvious need to reverse the erosion of its capital base. This 
insensitivity was reinforced by the format adopted in the ac-
counts, which reported the growing deficit as a debit item, 
rather than as a reduction in capital. 
Upon incorporation, the SOA (like the balance sheet) was 
legally required under the terms of TCC's bylaws. Initially, the 
information had been prepared to meet these reporting require-
ments. Yet, with the use of the SOA, the importance of timing 
and of periodicity began to emerge. The SOA did not merely 
record the company's financial situation, it also permitted man-
agement to ascertain where gains and losses were being made. 
However, TCC did not succeed in the shift from a family busi-
ness to a business enterprise, i.e., a shift from the proprietary to 
the entity view of the business and of the accounting for it, such 
that the information was not utilized to its potential. Instead, 
the payment of dividends appeared to be of more concern, 
rather than the impact of these payments upon TCC's capital 
base. 
Product markets were in transition and did not build upon 
TCC's existing strengths in the square timber industry. Techno-
logical innovation affected TCC and its efforts to expand into 
new products and maintain its competitive position. Thus, TCC 
was facing changes in its organizational domain which in-
creased uncertainty and required adaptation to new ways of 
doing business. Endeavors into new technologies and markets 
did not prove viable, supporting Haveman's [1992] proposition 
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tha t such efforts are less likely to succeed if they are not 
grounded in existing organizational strengths. TCC initially be-
gan operations when the market and its related institutional 
framework were more amenable to the entrepreneurial firm, as 
exemplified by the many early entrants into the timber industry. 
The death of D. D. Calvin left the term at a crossroads. Faced 
with increased competition, and without adequate human re-
sources, TCC was not positioned to confront the new challenges 
posed by the changes in the timber trade and by the technologi-
cal advances of the late-nineteenth century. For example, TCC's 
management had sought to change course via greater invest-
ment in more efficient equipment. This option was delayed, and 
later poorly implemented, due to the concurrent policy of pay-
ing out the major share of earnings as dividends. The increasing 
scale and scope of business implied concomitant adaptations in 
the administration and control of business organizations. The 
shift from a partnership to a corporation brought with it the 
privilege of limited liability, but also certain duties towards its 
shareholders. Incorporation also meant new requirements in 
terms of accounting which could not be met by the accounting 
methods of the partnership. 
Organizational culture, specifically the family style of busi-
ness, was an important factor in TCC's evolution. TCC's situa-
tion reinforces McCalla's [1979, 1984] findings concerning the 
reliance on family ties and close business associates; personal 
trust being the basis for many business transactions. It also 
supports the work of Flamholtz [1983] and Ouchi [1979, 1980] 
with respect to the role of socialization and clan mechanisms as 
part of the management control system. The family style of 
business was reflected in TCC's operations and in its accounting 
for them. The close involvement of partners reduced the need 
for the calculation of the firm's net worth and profitability. Peri-
odic assessment by the partners was possible through direct 
examination of the actual accounting records. No dissolution 
took place from 1854 to 1880, eliminating the need to determine 
partners ' wealth as at dissolution or the commencement of a 
new partnership. It also permitted TCC to retain its long-run 
concept of profit. However, the latter changed significantly in 
the later stages of the company. 
During TCC's first phase, the long-term view of profit was 
maintained, but the weaknesses of this perspective were becom-
ing evident. The limitations possibly were related to the length 
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of the partnership. Calvin and Breck remained partners for ap-
proximately thirty years, such that TCC would have been de-
scribed more aptly as an ongoing business, rather than as a 
series of joint ventures. These limitations became more obvious 
during the second period of TCC, especially with the adoption 
of corporate status. The emergence of a short-run focus also 
was revealed by increased attention to the balance sheet. The 
latter was not independent of the role of family members in the 
firm, and their remuneration. For example, with the entry of 
Hiram Calvin in the 1870s, the profit figure had to be allocated 
among three individuals; yet their financial position and inter-
ests conflicted. 
The reliance on homogeneous beliefs and family ties was 
threatened upon incorporation and contributed to TCC's de-
cline. While operating in outward form as a limited company, in 
substance, TCC remained a family business. TCC's waning years 
were ones of missed opportunities. TCC's dividend policy, which 
led to the erosion of its capital base, contributed to the latter. 
The payment of dividends (which were roughly double the re-
turn generated in the firm) lends support to the argument that 
TCC's decline was due, in part, to its unsuccessful shift from a 
family business to a business enterprise. The firm was utilized 
as a means to provide for family members who received divi-
dends (and in some cases salaries) from the firm, TCC was left 
without the capital required to sustain its place in the market. 
TCC's experience reinforces the argument of Bliss [1987] that 
family firms often failed to develop managerial expertise, in-
stead relying upon family ties and tradition. Indeed, the com-
ments of Bliss [1987, pp. 352-353] are appropriate here: 
The secret of making the transition from builder-pro-
moter-entrepreneur was to find ways of bringing the 
business under accounting control, if only by hiring 
people who could, . . . not just to produce a clear sense 
of where each department was going, but to use the 
accounts to unleash the energies of managers and em-
ployees whose responsibility for their performance 
could be clearly traced and measured, no matter how 
big the organization. 
The competitive environment of the twentieth century required 
the ability to control its ventures, but, significantly, also the 
ability to control those responsible for them. 
The research results affirm the need to consider accounting 
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within its environmental context. While the study is limited to 
one firm, the effect of rapid technological change, competitive 
pressures and new financial and organizational arrangements 
have parallels with present-day organizational experience. TCC's 
case provides insights to assess the potential outcome of at-
tempts to deal with current challenges. As noted by Previts et al 
[1990, p . 7], historical studies "specify social and economic con-
ditions that influence existing and proposed practice tech-
niques, enhancing our ability to evaluate competing techniques 
as suitable for the current environment and circumstances." 
Moreover, current research into management control perhaps 
needs to incorporate a longer time frame in order to understand 
the role of the accounting system, and to assess the influence of 
social, economic, and institutional forces. 
Accounting's implication in the assessment of perceived or-
ganizational possibilities cannot be disregarded in the formula-
tion of theoretical prescriptions for accounting practice. TCC's 
example demonstrates the unintended consequences of innova-
tions and of the accounting's systems efforts to account for 
them. Thus accounting researchers may achieve greater success 
with and acceptance of their theories by providing conditional 
prescriptions in terms of the particular organizational context. 
For example, organizational size and culture differ across firms, 
yet their effect may be circumscribed by other overriding envi-
ronmental forces. 
Future research is necessary to determine to what extent 
TCC's experience was similar to that of other firms of the pe-
riod. This would improve our understanding of organizational 
and accounting change and provide additional insights for de-
veloping more broadly-based theory. Finally, the differences be-
tween the proprietary and entity view of accounting, as demon-
strated within TCC, merit further attention. In TCC's later years, 
the accounting equation had been changed theoretically from 
Assets = Liabilities + Owners' Equity to Assets = Equities, high-
lighting the separation of the owner from the entity or organiza-
tion. The increasing importance of the corporate form and the 
role of the shareholder versus proprietor/partner contributed to 
this shift in perspective. Profit was no longer a long-run change 
in wealth, but net income, i.e., revenues less expenses. It may be 
fruitful to reexamine these differences in terms of recent re-
search into foundational issues. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Calvin Company Copartnerships 
1839 Calvin Cook & Counter organized December 1839. 
1843 Departure of Counter at close of year. 
1844 C. E. Dunn enters partnership with l/6th share. 
Business known as Calvin Cook & Co. at Garden Island, and Dunn 
Calvin & Co. at Quebec. 
Opening of Hamilton branch, Hiram Cook & Co. 
1846 C. E. Dunn leaves partnership at end of year. 
1847 T. H. Dunn replaces his brother effective January 1st. 
1850 T. H. Dunn leaves partnership at June 1850. Calvin and Cook divide 
their interests. 
Quebec branch becomes D. D. Calvin & Co., other names unchanged. 
1851 I. A. Breck assumes a 25% interest in Calvin's business in January. 
1854 Calvin and Cook formally dissolve partnership. 
1855 Calvin and Breck formally recognize 1851 agreement. New partnership 
known as Calvin & Breck at Garden Island, Quebec branch name un-
changed. 
1873 H. A. Calvin purchases a 25% interest from his father. 
1877 H. A. Calvin transfers his share back to his father. 
1880 Breck retires. H. A. Calvin reenters firm, but with payment of salary in 
lieu of share in profits. Firm renamed Calvin & Son. 
1884 D. D. Calvin dies, and his estate divided amongst heirs. 
1886 The firm reorganized as a limited-liability company in June 1886. The 
new company called The Calvin Company Limited. 
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APPENDIX 3 









































































































Source: The Calvin Collection, The Marine Museum of the Great Lakes. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Dividend Policy — The Calvin Company 
1887 to 1915 
TOTAL PROFIT DECLARED $ 172,827.00 
TOTAL LOSSES DECLARED 186,060.84 
BALANCE OF LOSSES 
OVER PROFIT $ (13,233.84) 
TOTAL PROFIT DECLARED $ 172,827.00 
LESS DIVIDENDS 132,300.00 
BALANCE OF PROFIT 
OVER DIVIDENDS $ 40,527.00 
TOTAL LOSSES DECLARED 186,060.84 
DEFICIT ACCOUNT AT 
DECEMBER 1915 $(145,533.84) 
DIVIDENDS AS A % OF PROFIT DECLARED: 76.55% 
TOTAL LOSSES TO TOTAL PROFIT: 1.08:1 
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APPENDIX 5 
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* Liquid Assets = (Cash + Bills Receivable) 
** Average = 169.93% (σ = 222.09, n=19) 
Source: The Calvin Collection, The Marine Museum of the Great Lakes. 
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APPENDIX 6 

























































































































Source: The Calvin Collection, The Marine Museum of the Great Lakes. 
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